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QUINTANA v. UNITED BLOOD SERVICES:
EXAMINING INDUSTRY PRACTICE IN
TRANSFUSION-RELATED AIDS CASES
AIDS throws new light on traditional questions of value,
compels a fresh look at the performance of the institutions
we depend on and brings society to a crossroads for collective
action that may, with the passage of years, mark a key
measure of our time.
- Harvey V. Fineberg, Dean of the
-Harvard School of Public Health'
INTRODUCTION
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) presents one
of the most serious and controversial public health problems of
our time.2 Since the first cases of AIDS were diagnosed in the
United States in 1981, the number of people infected with the
Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), which causes AIDS and
AIDS-related conditions, has increased exponentially.' The
Centers for Disease Control (CDC) estimates that as many as
1.5 million people are infected with the virus in the U.S. alone.'
Fueled in part by such numbers, the widespread fear generated
by HIV is unprecedented in modern society.
5
'Harvey V. Fineberg, The Social Dimension of AIDS, Sci. AM., Oct. 1988,
at 128.
2 Dianne Feinstein, Foreword to AIDS: PRINCIPLES, PRACTICES & POLITICS
xv, xv (Inge B. Corless & Mary Pittman-Lindeman eds., 1988).
s Susan Y. Chu, Epidemiology of HIV in the United States, in AIDS:
ETIOLOGY, DIAGNOSIS, TREATMENT AND PREVENTION 99,99 (Vincent D. DeVita,
Jr. et al. eds., 3d ed. 1992). From 1981 through February 1991, over 160,000
AIDS cases in the United States were reported to the Centers for Disease
Control (CDC). Presently AIDS is the second leading cause of death in men
in the U.S. between the ages of 25 and 44 years, and the eighth leading killer
among women aged 25 to 44. Paul A. Volberding, Clinical Spectrum of HIV
Disease, in AIDS: ETIOLOGY, DIAGNOSIS, TREATMENT AND PREVENTION, supra,
at 123, 123.
4 William L. Heyward & James W. Curran, The Epidemiology of AIDS in
the U.S., ScI. AM., Oct. 1988, at 72. While infection with HIV may lead to
full-blown AIDS, infected persons can be asymptomatic carriers. Id. An
estimated five to ten million people worldwide are infected with the AIDS
virus. Jonathan M. Mann et al., The International Epidemiology ofAIDS, SCI.
AM., Oct. 1988, at 82.
5 D. Anthony Forrester, AIDS: The Responsibility to Care, 34 VILL. L.
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What began primarily as a medical problem, today raises a
number of troublesome political, social, and ethical questions,
which pose profound challenges to the legal system. Presently
courts must confront the issue of liability of blood suppliers for
transfusion-associated AIDS. With approximately three million
Americans each year, and ninety-five percent of the U.S. popula-
tion by the time they reach age seventy-two, requiring transfu-
sions of blood or blood products,6 the quality of the nation's
blood supply, particularly in light of the AIDS epidemic, affects
much of our society.7
As of February 1991, over five thousand people were infec-
ted with HIV-contaminated blood or blood products and develop-
ing AIDS.8 Moreover, the CDC estimates that up to 15,000
people are currently infected with transfusion-related HIV.9
The majority of these cases involve blood or blood products
received before a screening test for the HIV antibody became
available in 1985.10 Since the average incubation period" of the
disease is 7.8 years with a maximum period of approximately
ten years, 2 individuals infected with HIV prior to 1985 may
have developed symptoms of AIDS and many subsequently have
died.'" Fortunately, the victims of HIV-contaminated transfu-
sions can turn to the legal system to seek compensation from
the suppliers of the tainted blood for their injuries.
REV. 799, 799 (1989).
6 See Ross D. Eckert, Blood, Money, and Monopoly, in SECURING A SAFER
BLOOD SUPPLY 3, 49 (Ross D. Eckert & Edward L. Wallace eds., 1985), for a
discussion of blood, plasma, their various components, and the products that
can be derived from each.
7 id.
8 Chu, supra note 3, at 106.
' Update: Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome - United States, 1989,
39 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 81 (1990).
10 Chu, supra note 3, at 106.
n The incubation or latency period is the delay between the time of HIV
which causes AIDS and AIDS-related conditions, infection and the manifesta-
tion of clinical AIDS symptoms. Susan Aoki & Paul Holland, The Safety of
Blood and Blood Products, in AIDS: ETIOLOGY, DIAGNOSIs, TREATMENT AND
PREVENTION, supra note 3, at 463, 464.
" Study Predicts 99 Percent of Infected Men to Get AIDS, 3 AIDS Pol'y &
L. (BNA) No. 11, at 2 (June 15, 1988).
"' Aoki & Holland, supra note 11, at 464.
TRANSFUSION-RELATED AIDS LIABILITY
The protection courts once afforded blood banks from such
AIDS litigation is diminishing. 4 Until recently, blood suppli-
ers were not held negligent for contaminated transfusions
because the common perception was that during the early
1980's, transfusion-transmitted HIV did not pose a foreseeable
risk.'" However, in Quintana v. United Blood Services,'6 a
Colorado state court jury abrogated this view, ordering a blood
supplier to pay over six million dollars in damages to a woman
who contracted AIDS from a 1983 transfusion.17 The jury
rejected the blood bank's claim that in light of limited medical
knowledge available at the time of the transfusion, the blood
bank took reasonable and prudent precautions to safeguard the
blood supply.'" Rather, the jury concluded not only that the
defendant blood bank was negligent under the prevailing stan-
dard of care, but that the 1983 industry standard as a whole
was deficient.'9
The Quintana litigation marked the first time in the United
States that a judge allowed a jury to scrutinize blood industry
standards at the time of an HIV-tainted transfusion.20 Subse-
quently, Quintana opens the door to recovery under a negligence
theory for other transfusion victims. 2' This Article examines
"I Kathryn G. Lotfi, Suppliers of AIDS-Contaminated Blood Now Face
Liability, 34 How. L.J. 183, 183 (1992); David Stevens, Negligence Liability for
Transfusion-AssociatedAIDS Transmission, 12 J. LEGAL MED. 221,240 (1991).
15 See Kozup v. Georgetown Univ., 663 F. Supp. 1048, 1057-58 (D.D.C.
1987) (refusing to hold blood bank liable for failure to employ surrogate testing
where no governmental or medical organizations advocated its use for AIDS
screening), affd in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 851 F.2d 437 (D.C.
Cir. 1988); Doe v. Miles Lab., Inc., 927 F.2d 187, 195 (4th Cir. 1991); Osborn
v. Irwin Memorial Blood Bank, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 101, 128-29 (Cal. Ct. App.
1992).
16 No. 86 Civ. 11750 (Dist. Ct., Denver County, Colo. Aug. 1, 1991) (special
verdict form), affd, 811 P.2d 424 (Colo. App. 1991), affd and remanded, 827
P.2d 509 (Colo. 1992).
17 Id.
18 See id.
19 Id.
20 Howard Pankratz, $8 Million Awarded in AIDS Trial, DENVER POST,
August 2, 1992, at 1A, 15A.
" The date of the contaminated transfusion is a key factor in determining
the imposition of liability where the knowledge concerning AIDS changed
rapidly. Prior to 1982 the possibility of AIDS being transmissible by blood
transfusions had not been publicized. Thus, the case for imposing liability
becomes stronger as the date of the transfusion gets later.
4771993]
478 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 2:475
the liability of blood suppliers for transfusion-associated AIDS
and argues that imposing liability on blood banks for failing to
reduce the threat of transfusion-transmitted AIDS in 1983
achieves a socially desirable result. Part I briefly outlines the
medical knowledge regarding transfusion-associated AIDS and
the evolution of the blood banking community's position con-
cerning the epidemic. Part II establishes an analytical frame-
work for the Quintana case by reviewing the theories of liability
typically advanced by victims of HIV-tainted transfusions and
the obstacles impeding each theory. Part III examines
Quintana, focusing particularly on the implications of the deci-
sion for future transfusion cases. Part IV discusses the public
policy issues involved and concludes that the public interest is
best served by imposing liability on the blood industry for
failing to take readily available precautions to reduce the risk of
HIV-contaminated transfusions between mid-1983 and 1985.
I. AIDS: A BRIEF BACKGROUND OF THE DISEASE
Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) is a fatal
viral disease caused by a human retrovirus referred to as the
Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV).2 The virus is trans-
mitted by exposure to infected blood, sexual contact with an
infected person, and perinatally, from an infected mother to her
child.23 Infected persons are susceptible to a number of oppor-
tunistic infections and diseases which would not normally affect
healthy individuals. 24 While individuals infected with HIV
may remain healthy and asymptomatic,26 the fatality rate of
the infection is extraordinarily high:26 almost 100% mortality
among patients with opportunistic infections and cancers.27
22 Ruth I. Connor & David D. Ho, Etiology of AIDS: Biology of Human
Retroviruses, in AIDS: ETIOLOGY, DIAGNOsIs, TREATMENT AND PREVENTION,
supra note 3, at 13, 13.
' Alan R. Lifson, Transmission of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus, in
AIDS: ETIOLOGY, DAGNOSIS, TREATMENT AND PREVENTION, supra note 3, at
111, 111-16. Although HIV may be present in nearly any body fluid, the virus
is transmissible only by blood, semen, and vaginal and cervical secretions. Id.
24 Volberding, supra note 3, at 123.
Id. at 128. Such individuals are often unaware that they are infected
with IV, yet are carriers of the virus, capable of transmitting it to others.
Id.
26 Id. at 123.
' Paul A. Volberding, AIDS Overview, in AIDS: PRINCIPLES, PRACTICES,
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Ultimately, AIDS destroys the body's natural immune system
and affects the central nervous system, leading to mental
deterioration.2" Presently, researchers have found no vaccine
or cure for the disease.'
AIDS was first recognized in mid-1981 in major urban areas
of the United States and primarily among homosexual men. °
Although medical knowledge regarding the disease was limited,
the general public knew by 1982 that certain groups - includ-
ing homosexual and bisexual men, intravenous drug users, and
recently arrived Haitians - were at high risk for contracting
AIDS.31 At that time, no test was available to detect either the
presence of the HIV virus or exposure to the virus in blood or
blood products. 2
The Centers for Disease Control (CDC)33 received the first
report of a hemophilia patient with AIDS in January 1982.'
Six months later, the CDC published an article describing three
cases of AIDS in heterosexual hemophiliacs who were neither
intravenous drug users nor Haitian immigrants, suggesting for
the first time-the-transmissibility of AIDS by blood.35 Follow-
& POLITICS, supra note 2, at 97, 99.
2 8 Id.
2 Id. at 97.
" Myron Essex, Origin of AIDS, in AIDS: ETIOLOGY, DIAGNOSIS, TREAT-
MENT AND PREVENTION, supra note 3, at 3, 3.
31 See Quintana v. United Blood Serv., 827 P.2d 509, 514 (Colo. 1992); see
also Matt Clark, AIDS: A Lethal Mystery Story, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 27, 1982, at
63.
32 See Kozup v. Georgetown Univ., 663 F. Supp. 1048, 1057 (D.D.C. 1987),
aff'd in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 851 F.2d 437 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
A test for exposure to the virus would detect HIV antibodies, generated in
response to the virus.
33 See OFFICE OF THE FED. REGISTER, NAT'L ARCHIVES AND RECORDS
ADMIN., UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MANUAL, 1989/90, at 307 (1989). The
CDC is an agency in the Public Health Service charged with preventing and
controlling infectious and chronic diseases and reducing health risks through
education and information.
' Terence L. Chorba & Bruce L. Evatt, Transfusion-associated AIDS, in
BLOOD, BLOOD PRODUCTS, AND AIDS 17, 23 (R. Madhok et al. eds., 1987).
Hemophilia is a hereditary blood defect almost exclusively of males character-
ized by delayed clotting of the blood and consequent difficulty in controlling
bleeding even after minor iijuries. WEBSTER'S NNTH NEW COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 564 (1984).
' Pneumocystosis Carinii Pneumonia among Persons with Hemophilia A,
31 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 365, 365-67 (1982); see Osborn v.
1993] 479
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ing this publication, the Public Health Service held an open
meeting of its Committee on Opportunistic Infections in Pa-
tients with Hemophilia, alerting attendees to the possible
transmission of AIDS by blood.3" In December 1982, the CDC
published another article about an infant diagnosed with AIDS
one year after receiving multiple blood transfusions.s7 An
investigation revealed that one of the nineteen blood donors had
also developed AIDS.3" In the same article the CDC also dis-
closed that two adults who fell into no high-risk group for AIDS,
but who had also received blood transfusions, suffered from
AIDS symptoms." The article closed by stating: "This report
and continuing reports of AIDS among persons with hemo-
philia A raise serious questions about the possible transmission
of AIDS through blood and blood products."4
The reaction of blood suppliers to the CDC's reports was
mixed. The majority refused, at least publicly, to accept the
potential threat of transfusion-related AIDS and worried about
the negative impact of the articles on the blood supply.4 Dr.
Joseph Bove, head of the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA)
Blood Advisory Committee42 and an officer of the American
Association of Blood Banks, displayed the prevalent attitude: In
response to the announcement that AIDS might be in the blood
supply, he publicly denied any evidence that transfusions spread
Irwin Memorial Blood Bank, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 101, 112 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
These patients had received numerous injections of the blood product Factor
VIII used by hemophiliacs.
36 See Kozup, 663 F. Supp. at 1051. Among those in attendance were
representatives of the American Red Cross (ARC), the CDC, the National
Institutes if Health (NIH), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the
American Association of Blood Bankers, and the National Gay Task Force.
37 Possible Transfusion-Associated Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
(AIDS) - California, 31 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 652, 652-54
(1982).
3Id. at 653.
39 Id. at 654.
40 Id.
41 RANDY SHILTS, AND THE BAND PLAYED ON 207 (1988).
42 This committee is made up of a small group of industry and medical
experts who meet quarterly with FDA officials to offer advice on regulatory
matters. Andrea Rock, Inside the Billion Dollar Business of Blood, MONEY,
March 1986. at 152.
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AIDS.' Nonetheless others became convinced that AIDS was
bloodborne."
On January 4, 1983, the CDC sponsored a meeting to
discuss several reported cases of AIDS and possible methods of
protecting the nation's blood supply.45 At that time, five re-
ported cases of AIDS among hemophiliacs existed, along with
one possible transfusion-related case, and five other AIDS cases
related to blood products.46 While the participants discussed
various measures for donor screening guidelines, no consensus
was reached about implementing such safety measures.47
On January 13, 1983, the American Red Cross, the Ameri-
can Association of Blood Banks, and the Council of Community
Blood Banks' released a joint statement that while the possi-
bility that AIDS was transmissible by blood did exist, the
evidence was "inconclusive."49 Nevertheless they recommended
making autologous transfusions" more readily available and
SHILTS, supra note 41, at 207.
See Rock, supra note 42, at 152. Following a December 1982 meeting
arranged by the FDA in which a CDC doctor presented the data regarding
HIV-contaminated blood transfusions, Dr. William V. Miller, a member of the
FDA's blood advisory committee recalled believing that at least some AIDS
cases were being caused by tainted blood. Id.
"' See Kozup v. Georgetown Univ., 663 F. Supp. 1048, 1051-52 (D.D.C.
1987), affd in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 851 F.2d 437 (D.C. Cir.
1988). Representatives from several organizations were present at the
meeting, including the following: the ARC, the NIH, the American Association
of Blood Banks, the National Hemophilia Foundation, the Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers Association,the National Gay Task Force. Id. Officials from
the CDC were also present, as well as representatives from the Food and Drug
Administration, the one federal agency with regulatory power over the blood
banks.
4Id. at 1051.
47 Id. The organizations agreed that members of high risk groups should
be precluded from donating blood although they did not reach agreement on
a means of doing this. They discussed the possibility of screening out individ-
uals on the basis of sexual orientation. They, however, declined to adopt such
a practice, questioning whether it would be either appropriate or effective.
4' The American Red Cross processes 50% of the nation's blood supply
while members of the American Association of Blood Banks provides much of
the remainder. Osborn v. Irwin Memorial Blood Bank, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 101,
114 n.6 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
49Kozup, 663 F. Supp. at 1052.
50 For patients undergoing elective surgery, one alternative to receiving
transfusions from anonymous donors is to store their own blood in advance in
19931
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initiating more thorough donor screening by allowing potential
donors to self-defer if they fell into a high-risk group.5 The
statement did not go so far as to endorse surrogate testing,52
nor did it advocate direct or indirect questioning about a donor's
sexual preference.53 Notably, while the joint statement down-
played the risk of transfusion-transmitted AIDS, the chairman
of the joint statement committee acknowledged in a private
memo dated January 24, 1983, that future transfusion-related
cases would likely occur and that the most that could be done in
the situation would be to "buy time."' He warned that he did
not want society or lawyers to interpret the committee's actions
as "agreeing with the concept.., that AIDS can be spread by
blood."5
Notwithstanding the January 13 joint statement, the
National Hemophilia Foundation5 in a memorandum of Janu-
ary 14, 1983 encouraged added safety measures and recom-
mended that source plasma centers manufacturing blood prod-
anticipation of the surgery. Chorba & Evatt, supra note 34, at 177-78.
51 Eckert, supra note 6, at 62. This involved educating potential donors
through posters and brochures which listed specific groups at high risk for
AIDS and urged those who fell within these categories to refrain from donat-
ing.
52 Where no direct test is available to detect the presence of a disease or
the antibody generated by the disease, surrogate tests may be employed to
determine if factors believed to be statistically linked to the disease are
present. The Hepatitis-B Core Antibody Test is an example of a surrogate test
which screens for the antibodies to hepatitis, a disease often present in people
who have AIDS. One problem associated with these tests is that they have a
two to five percent false positive rate, thus causing uninfected blood to be
improperly rejected. Quintana v. United Blood Serv., 827 P.2d 509, 515 n.3
(Colo. 1992).
' These measures would probably have imposed additional costs on
suppliers, but would have increased the safety of transfusions at the time.
'4 See BLOOD SUPPLY SAFETY: HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON OVER-
SIGHT AND INvESTIGATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. 73-74, 91-92 (1990) [hereinafter BLOOD SUPPLY SAFETY]
(Internal report written by Dr. Bove, Exhibit C, and testimony concerning that
report).
5 Id.
" The National Hemophilia Foundation is a voluntary health organization
consisting of hemophiliacs, their families, health care professionals and other
interested persons. The organization supports research, disseminates litera-
ture and helps in blood recruitment drives. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ASSOCIATIONS
12735 (26th ed. 1992).
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ucts "implement direct questioning of blood donors and evaluate
and implement surrogate testing of donated blood in order to
reduce the risk of AIDS."57 In March 1983, the FDA and the
United States Public Health Service advised the blood banking
industry to institute safety measures, including self-screening
and improved educational programs for blood bank personnel,
aimed at decreasing blood collection from high-risk groups.5"
Neither agency, however, recommended that blood banks adopt
surrogate tests.59
Six months later, the Stanford University Blood Bank
departed from industry custom by using a surrogate test on
donated blood designed to reduce transfusion transmission of
AI]DS. 0 In a unique display of insight, officials at the Stanford
Blood Bank reasoned that the unusually long latent phase of
AIDS and the extraordinarily high fatality iate of the disease
warranted extra precautions." Dr. Edgar G. Engleman, medi-
cal Director of the Stanford Blood Bank acknowledged that the
test was not perfect, yet stated "the benefits of preventing at
least some AIDS-contaminated blood from entering the blood
supply outweighed the fact that a small amount of normal blood
was unavoidably discarded and that each unit of blood cost six
dollars more."62
Staff members of at least one other blood bank recognized
the safety advantages of surrogate tests and recommended their
use; however, the blood banking industry's opposition prevented
their adoption.' Dr. David De Jongh, the former director of
the Blood Bank at Charity Hospital in New Orleans, and propo-
nent of surrogate testing, explained in an affidavit that the
blood industry's opposition was due in part to "their fear that
the institution of the core test by some blood banks would create
17 Quintana v. United Blood Serv., 827 P.2d 509, 515 (Colo. 1992).
' Kozup v. Georgetown Univ., 663 F. Supp. 1048, 1052 (D.D.C. 1987), affd
in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 851 F.2d 437 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
59 Id.
e' BLOOD SUPPLY SAFETY, supra note 54, at 34 (testimony of Dr. Edgar G.
Engleman, Medical Director, Stanford University Blood Center). The Stanford
Blood Bank was the first in the U.S. to screen donated blood with a surrogate
test, referred to as the T cell ratio test, which added six dollars to the cost of
each unit of blood. Id.
61id.
6 Id.
' Id. at 94 (Affidavit of Dr. De Jongh, Exhibit E).
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a standard of care by which their blood banks would be required
to abide."' Exhibiting this fear, other blood banks rejected the
conclusion that the benefits of testing justified the costs and
declined to initiate similar measures. 65 They criticized Stan-
ford's testing program as a publicity stunt creating unnecessary
panic and anxiety and ignored later evidence demonstrating the
efficacy of surrogate testing.'
In 1984 the medical community finally reached a consensus
that AIDS was in fact transmissible by blood.67 In April, scien-
tists in the United States and France independently isolated
and identified the virus that most experts regard as the proba-
ble cause of AIDS.68  One year later a screening test for the
HIV antibody, the enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA)
test, became available and the CDC implemented guidelines for
its use.69 The ELISA test has proven 98.6% effective in detect-
ing exposure to AIDS, and when paired with a second test, the
Western Blot Analysis, the detection rate increases to 100%.7"
Consequently, the risk of contracting AIDS from blood products
A Id.
65 Id.
' Id. at 96. Follow-up interviews in 1983 revealed several donors whose
blood had been rejected based on the screening test, yet who had donated at
other blood banks despite falling into categories at high risk for AIDS.
Moreover, the introduction of the HIV antibody test enabled the Stanford
Blood Bank to retrospectively test frozen blood that had been excluded which
showed that the test had screened out approximately two-thirds of the HIV
infected individuals who had donated blood. Id.
' James W. Curran et al., Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS)
Associated With Transfusion, 310 N. ENG. J. MED. 69, 69-75 (1984).
' Volberding, supra note 27, at 97-98. Dr. Robert C. Gallo of the U.S.
National Cancer Institute referred to the retrovirus as HTLV-III, while Dr.
Luc Montagnier at the Pasteur Institute in Paris called it LAV and Jay Levy
of the University of California, San Francisco called it ARV. In 1986, an
international committee on nomenclature renamed the retrovirus now known
as HIV. Id.
69 Kozup v. Georgetown Univ., 663 F. Supp. 1048, 1052-53 (D.D.C. 1987)
(citations omitted), affd in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 851 F.2d
437 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
" Id.; see also Philip P. Mortimer, Serological Tests, in BLOOD, BLOOD
PRODUCTS AND AIDS, supra note 34, at 125, 135. The procedure employed is
to first use and ELISA. If the result is positive, a second ELISA is used. If
the result is still positive, the blood is then subject to the Western Blot, which
is both a more complex and more expensive procedure. Id.
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has declined considerably.7' Nonetheless, an estimated 15,000
people were infected with HIV through blood and blood products
prior to 1985,72 most of whom are expected to eventually devel-
op AIDS.73
Transfusion recipients who have subsequently developed
AIDS symptoms can turn to the legal system to seek compensa-
tion from doctors, hospitals, and blood banks under theories of
tort and contract. Until recently, courts have consistently sided
with blood suppliers on the grounds that the suppliers' know-
ledge of transfusion-associated AIDS in the early 1980's was
limited and that the measures taken to reduce risk conformed
to the general custom and practice among blood banks.74 How-
ever, as the court in Quintana ultimately concluded, evidence
suggests that the blood industry could have responded to the
HIV-threat more diligently.75 By 1983, AIDS had become a
"major blood banking issue"" and the general public was
aware that the blood supply could be contaminated by HIV.77
In addition, the industry knew that certain high-risk groups for
AIDS should be excluded from donating blood.7" Yet confront-
ed with the opportunity to respond to this threat in early 1983,
the blood banking industry first rejected reports that AIDS
could be spread by blood and, when it could no longer deny the
risk of transfusion transmission, downplayed it.79 In the face
7' The possibility still exists that a person infected with HIV may falsely
test negative where the infection has not yet progressed to the stage in which
antibodies develop.
72Aoki & Holland, supra note 11, at 464.
7s Peter L. Page, AIDS Damage Liabilities: Tort Risks and Remedies for
AIDS Transmission, in AIDS AND THE COURTS 307, 307 (Clark C. Abt &
Kathleen M. Hardy eds., 1990).
' Kozup, 663 F. Supp. at 1056-57; Quintana v. United Blood Servs., 811
P.2d 424,427 (Colo. App. 1991), affd, 827 P.2d 509 (Colo. 1992); see also Roger
Parloff, Tainted Tort, AM. LAW., Sept. 1992, at 76.
75 PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE HUMAN IMMuNODEFICIENCY VIRUS
EPIDEMIC, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE HUMAN IMMU-
NODEFICIENCY VIRUS EPIDEMIC 78 (1988) [hereinafter PREsIDENTIAL COMMIS-
SION REPORT].
76 Wadley Research Inst. v. Beeson, 835 S.W.2d 689, 699 (Tex. Ct. App.
1992).
7 Clark, supra note 31, at 63.
71 See Quintana v. United Blood Serv., 827 P.2d 509, 515 (Colo. 1992); see
also SHILTS, supra note 41, at 224.
79BLOOD SUPPLY SAFETY, supra note 54, at 12-13 (testimony of Dr. Marcus
1993] 85
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of the AIDS threat, most blood banks failed to adopt available
measures which would have reduced the amount of HIV tainted
blood entering the blood supply.0 They avoided promoting
effective screening procedures, implementing surrogate tests,
educating the public about the risk of transfusion transmitted
AIDS, or encouraging alternative methods of collecting blood."'
In short, the blood industry subjected transfusion recipients to
an unreasonable risk of contracting AIDS through blood during
the early years of the AIDS epidemic.
II. THEORIES OF LIABILITY
Victims of contaminated transfusions can turn to the legal
system for relief. Typically, three theories of liability are
available against blood banks: strict products liability, breach
of implied warranties, and negligence. In pursuing each theory,
plaintiffs face substantial obstacles which tend to insulate blood
suppliers from liability. The following section discusses the
three theories in the context of transfusion-related AIDS and
examines the difficulties associated with each.
A. STRICT LIABILITY
Plaintiffs generally attempt to impose liability on blood
banks under the doctrine of strict liability for the sale of an
unreasonably dangerous product.8 2 Section 402A of the Second
Restatement of Torts provides that one who sells a product
which is in a defective condition and is unreasonably dangerous
to the user is strictly liable for harm." Specifically, strict
A. Conant, Professor, University of California Medical Center at San Francis-
co); Rock, supra note 42, at 152.
11 See generally BLOOD SUPPLY SAFETY, supra note 54.
8 1 Id. at 12-13 (testimony of Dr. Marcus Conant).
82 See generally Kozup v. Georgetown Univ., 663 F. Supp. 1048 (D.D.C.
1987), aff'd in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 851 F.2d 437 (D.C. Cir.
1988); McKee v. Miles Labs., 675 F. Supp. 1060 (E.D. Ky. 1987); Kirkendall v.
Harbor Ins. Co. 698 F. Supp. 768 (W.D. Ark. 1988).
Section 402A states:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for
physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his
property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
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liability applies only where the sale of a product has occurred,
rather than the provision of a service.84 Because of this dis-
tinction, transfusion victims have argued that a blood transfu-
sion is a sale of a product, thereby subjecting blood banks to
strict liability, while blood banks have countered that they are
providing a service, and consequently insulated from strict
liability." Thus, in determining the applicability of the strict
liability doctrine, the threshold issue is whether the acquisition
of blood or blood products constitutes a sale of a product or a
service.
1. Common Law
Traditionally, courts have safeguarded hospital blood
suppliers, holding that when a hospital furnishes blood or blood
products to a paying patient "as an incident to hospital treat-
ment," the provision is a service, therefore exempting the
hospital from strict liability.86 Some jurisdictions have distin-
guished between hospitals and blood banks and have permitted
sales-based liability claims against the latter on the grounds
that they are sellers of blood rather than providers of medical
care."7 The more widely accepted view, however, recognizes no
distinction between a transfusion as part of a more general
(b) it is expected to and does reach the consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale
of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
84 Id.
'5 See Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp., 123 N.E.2d 792, 793 (N.Y. 1954);
Kozup, 663 F. Supp. at 1058-60.
"See Perlmutter, 123 N.E.2d at 796. But see Cunningham v. MacNeal
Memorial Hosp., 266 N.E.2d 897, 901 (Il. 1970). Notably, while Cunningham
rejected the service analysis, the Illinois legislature subsequently overturned
Cunningham.
17 See generally Hansen v. Mercy Hospital, 570 P.2d 1309 (Colo. Ct. App.
1977); Russell v. Community Blood Bank, 185 So. 2d 749 (Fla. 1966); Hoder v.
Sayet, 196 So. 2d 205 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Weber v. Charity Hosp., 487
So. 2d 148 (La. 1986). In the three jurisdictions which distinguish between
hospitals and blood banks, legislatures have overruled these decisions by
statute.
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medical treatment from the transfusion alone."8 This is illus-
trated in Roberts v. Suburban Hospital Association,89 where
the plaintiff, a hemophiliac who received transfusions from the
defendant hospital, later became infected with HIV.9" Al-
though the plaintiff did not receive the transfusion as part of a
more general treatment, the court dismissed his strict liability
and breach of warranties claims on the grounds that they arose
from the provision of a service.9 The court reasoned, "A trans-
fusion is not just a sale of blood .... The transfusion ... is
what [the patient] really needs and pays for and that involves
the application of medical skill. It would be artificial at best,
and probably inaccurate, to conclude as a matter of law that the
product predominates over the service." 2
2. Blood Shield Statutes
This common law distinction between a sale and a service,
and the resulting judicial protection of blood suppliers has been
codified in forty-eight states with the passage of so-called blood
shield statutes.9" These statutes provide immunity to blood
banks and blood products manufacturers in one of two ways.
Either the statutes specifically characterize the distribution of
blood as a service, not a sale, or the statutes expressly safe-
guard suppliers of blood and blood products from strict liabili-
ty.94 Additionally, courts have consistently construed blood
shield statutes in favor of blood suppliers, effectively barring
plaintiffs' strict liability claims.95
' See Howell v. Spokane & Inland Empire Blood Bank, 785 P.2d 815, 821
(Wash. 1990); Roberts v. Suburban Hosp. Assoc., 532 A.2d 1081, 1088 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1987).
" 532 A.2d 1081 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1987).
'o Id. at 1082.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 1088.
s For a list of blood shield statutes, see id. at 1086 n.3. Every state has
enacted blood shield statutes except New Jersey and Vermont.
4 See Dana J. Finberg, Note, Blood Bank and Blood Products Manufactur-
er Liability in Transfusion-Related AIDS Cases, 26 U. RICH. L. REv. 519, 524
nn.32-33 (1992).
" See generally McKee v. Miles Labs., 675 F. Supp. 1060 (E.D. Ky. 1987).
See Finberg, supra note 94, at 531, for a brief discussion on how plaintiffs may
argue around blood shield statutes. For example some statutes were specifi-
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The Connecticut blood shield statute, at issue in Coffee v.
Cutter Biological and Miles Laboratories," barred claims aris-
ing from breach of implied warranties, but remained silent as to
strict liability.97 Nevertheless, the court interpreted it to pre-
clude plaintiffs strict liability claim.98 In reaching this conclu-
sion, the court relied on the "plain and unambiguous" words of
the statute, which characterized transactions involving blood
and blood components as services rather than sales.99
3. Comment k
Some courts have circumvented the strict liability analysis
by categorizing blood as an unavoidably unsafe product as
defined in comment k to section 402A of the Second Restate-
ment of Torts.00 Comment k provides that a product which is
"incapable of being made safe for [its] intended use" will not'
give rise to strict liability. An example of this type of product
cited in the Restatement is the rabies vaccine.' 1 While the
injection of the vaccine may produce "serious and damaging
consequences," its use is justified where the "disease itself
invariably leads to a dreadful death.'1 2 In the case of con-
cally addressed to hepatitis and not amended until after the transfusion. See,
e.g., Miles Labs. v. Doe, 556 A.2d 1107, 1111 (Md. 1989). Nevertheless in such
cases, courts have found blood banks immune from liability under the common
law.
96809 F.2d 191 (2d Cir. 1987).
17 The statute provides:
The implied warranties of merchantability and fitness shall not be
applicable to a contract for the sale of human blood, blood plasma,
or other human tissue or organs from a blood bank or reservoir of
such other tissues or organs. Such blood, blood plasma, and the
components, derivatives or fractions thereof, or tissue or organs
shall not be considered as medical services.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-280 (West 1986).
98 Coffee, 809 F.2d at 191.
' Id. at 193. The court rejected the plaintiff's claims that the statute did
not bar strict liability claims and did not apply to commercial manufacturers
of blood products. Id.
' See Snyder v. Mekhjian, 582 A.2d 307, 312 (N.J. 1990); Miles Labs., 556
A.2d at 1107; Brody v. Overlook Hosp., 317 A.2d 392, 397 (N.J. 1974); Hines
v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 527 P.2d 1075, 1076 (N.M. 1974).
10 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1966).
102 Id.
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taminated blood, the absence of a direct test to determine
whether a particular unit of blood was infected with the AIDS
virus prior to 1985 has influenced a few courts to classify blood
acquired during this period as an unavoidably unsafe product,
thereby precluding claims of strict liability."°3
In Miles Laboratories v. Doe,l 4 the court found the Mary-
land blood shield statute inapplicable;' 5 however, it catego-
rized both blood and blood products as "unavoidably unsafe" and
thus exempt from strict liability under comment k of the Re-
statement.0 6 The court reasoned, "the singular medical utili-
ty of blood and blood products, together with the compelling
necessity for their use when medically indicated, ordinarily
outweighs the known risk in all blood transfusions that the
products may contain some impurities.'
0 7
4. Summation
Blood suppliers have three weapons to avoid claims of strict
liability and effectively bar recipients of tainted transfusions
from recovery under this theory. First, blood banks may insu-
late themselves by turning to exculpatory blood shield statutes,
generally construed in favor of suppliers. 1' An alternative is
the common law characterization of a blood transfusion for a fee
as a service.1°9 Finally, blood banks may rely on the willing-
ness of some courts to classify blood as an "unavoidably unsafe
product" under comment k. 10 Consequently, the blood bank-
103 See cases cited supra note 100.
1 556 A.2d 1107 (Md. 1989).
105 At the time of the transfusion and filing of the suit, the statute had
limited immunity from transfusion-associated disease to infection with the
hepatitis virus. A later amendment extended protection for AIDS also, but the
court interpreted the amendment to apply prospectively. Id.
"
08 Id. at 1125. The court discussed the common law and its embracing of
§ 402, including comment k.
107 d. at 1121.
108 McKee v. Miles Labs., 675 F. Supp. 1060, 1062 (E.D. Ky. 1987); Coffee
v. Cutter Biological & Miles Labs., 809 F.2d 191, 194 (2d Cir. 1987).
109 Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp., 123 N.E.2d 792, 796 (N.Y. 1954);
Roberts v. Suburban Hosp. Assoc., 532 A.2d 1081, 1088 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1987).
110 Snyder v. Mekhjian, 582 A.2d 307, 312 (N.J. 1990).
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ing industry is virtually immune from the imposition of strict
liability.
B. BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTIES
A second theory of liability advanced by victims of HIV-
tainted transfusions is the breach of implied warranties of
merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose under the
Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.)."' Section 2-314 of the
U.C.C. subjects a seller to liability for the sale of goods which
fail to meet a certain minimum standard if the seller is '.'a
merchant with respect to goods of that kind."" In addition,
under section 2-315, a seller is liable if the good is unfit for the
particular purpose for which it is intended.11 3 The applicabili-
ty of breach of warranty in transfusion-associated AIDS cases
turns on whether blood and blood products are considered goods
for which a "seller" may be liable within the meaning of article
two of the U.C.C.. 114 While plaintiffs argue that the provision
of blood is the equivalent of a sale, subjecting sellers to implied
warranties, blood banks rely on the position that plaintiffs
acquired a service rather than a good." 5
"' Kozup v. Georgetown Univ., 663 F. Supp. 1048, 1051 (D.D.C. 1987),
affid in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 851 F.2d 437 (D.C. Cir. 1988);
Roberts, 532 A.2d at 1082.
" Section 2-314 provides: "(1) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316),
a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for
their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods for that kind."
U.C.C. § 2-314 (1972).
.. Section 2-315 provides:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any
particular purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer
is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable
goods, there is unless excluded or modified under the next section an
implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose.
U.C.C. § 2-315 (1972).
"" This is similar to the threshold issue in determining the susceptibility
of a blood supplier to a strict liability claim. See supra notes 86-92 and
accompanying text.
115 Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp., 123 N.E.2d 792, 793-95 (N.Y. 1954);
Kozup, 663 F. Supp. at 1058-59; Doe v. Cutter Lab., 703 F. Supp. 573 (N.D.
Tex. 1988).
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1. Common Law
Generally, courts have been reluctant to impose liability on
blood suppliers and blood products manufacturers for breach of
implied warranties."6  As with strict liability, courts have
turned to the sale/service distinction to insulate blood banks
from liability."' The seminal case in this area is Perlmutter
v. Beth David Hospital."8  In Perlmutter, a patient sued the
treating hospital for damages resulting from transfusion-
associated serum hepatitis."9 The plaintiff sought recovery on
the theory that a sale had occurred, thus subjecting the provider
of the blood to implied warranties. 2 ° The Court of Appeals of
New York rejected this view, characterizing the transfusion as
a service, and barring all claims based on implied
warranties.' 2 ' In arriving at this result, the court looked to
the primary object of the transaction between the plaintiff and
defendant, in this case the medical treatment, and concluded
that the transfer of blood for a fee was not a sale, but merely
incidental to the hospital's provision of services.2
2. Blood Shield Statutes
The Perlmutter immunity has been extended to blood banks
through previously discussed blood shield statutes, further
insulating blood suppliers from claims based upon implied
warranties. 23 The statutes either characterize the distribu-
tion of blood as a service, or expressly state that implied war-
ranties of merchantability and fitness are not applicable. Thus,
116 Kozup, 663 F. Supp. at 1058-59; Miles Labs. v. Doe, 556 A.2d 1107, 1123
(Md. 1989); Perlmutter, 123 N.E.2d at 795-96; Kirkendall v. Harbor Ins. Co.
698 F. Supp. 768, 770 (W.D. Ark. 1988).
117 See generally Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp., 123 N.E.2d 792 (N.Y.
1954).
118 Id.
'9 Id. at 793.
120 Id. at 793-96. In her complaint, plaintiff alleged that defendant, upon
whom she relied, knew the purpose for which the blood was to be used and
impliedly warranted that the blood was "fit" for its intended purpose, and of
"merchantable quality." Id. at 793.
121 Id. at 796.
122Id.
'" See supra notes 93-99 and accompanying text.
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neither strict products liability nor breach of implied warranties
present viable remedies to plaintiffs seeking recovery for con-
taminated transfusions.
C. NEGLIGENCE
As a result of the virtual immunity afforded blood suppliers
from sales-based liability, negligence has become the most likely
means of recovery for victims of AIDS-contaminated transfu-
sions. ' To establish negligence, a plaintiff must prove defen-
dant owed plaintiff a duty, defendant breached that duty, and
the breach was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury.'25
Plaintiffs who have contracted AIDS through transfusions
frequently predicate their negligence claims against blood banks
on deficient donor screening and failure to implement surrogate
testing.12
While negligence remains perhaps the sole viable remedy
for victims of AIDS-tainted transfusions, plaintiffs still face
obstacles in establishing the liability of blood banks under this
theory. To recover, plaintiffs must prove that a blood bank's
standard of care was below the industry standard, or that the
industry standard was so low that it was negligent.'27 Unfor-
tunately for plaintiffs, the industry standard of care at the time
of the transfusion is difficult to determine. Some courts have
excluded qualified experts not directly practicing in the blood
banking industry from testifying about the standard of care.
1 8
Also the Federal government's limitation on testimony and
production of documents from its employees at the Department
of Health and Human Services deprives plaintiffs of valuable
information concerning the CDC's evolving position on the
standard of care. 9 Finally, some courts deny plaintiffs access
Donald H. Hermann, AIDS: Malpractice and Transmission Liability, 58
U. COLO. L. REv. 81, 106 (1989).
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 30, at 165 (5th ed. 1984).
1 See Wilson v. Irwin Memorial Blood Bank, No. A054946, 1993 Cal. App.
LEXIS 375, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 9, 1993); Quintana v. United Blood Serv.,
827 P.2d 509, 515 (Colo. 1992).
'z Quintana, 827 P.2d at 519-21.
12 Id. at 513; Wilson, 1993 Cal. App. LEXIS 375, at *21.
'2 See generally Moore v. Armour Pharmaceutical, 927 F.2d 1194 (11th
Cir. 1991) (quashing subpoena of CDC physician).
1993] 493
494 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 2:475
to donor identities even though donors could best determine if
blood banks were adhering to customary practices.
130
1. The Standard of Care
The primary obstacle confronting victims of tainted transfu-
sions is establishing the standard of care at the time of transfu-
sion.13 1 Courts have held that blood banks should be judged
by a professional standard, established by the testimony of
qualified experts familiar with the norms of the industry.'32
Such a standard would allow a blood bank to escape liability
provided it adhered to industry custom. In other words, if a
blood bank exercised the "reasonable degree of skill, knowledge,
and care ordinarily possessed and exercised by others" in the
same industry under similar circumstances, then that supplier
met the applicable standard of care."' One commentator
explains this deference to industry custom as a function of the
"healthy respect which the courts have had for the learning of a
fellow profession and their reluctance to overburden it with
liability based on uneducated judgment."'' In effect, the pro-
fessional standard requires a court to find a blood bank free
from negligence if it followed the safety measures adopted by
other blood banks at the time of transfusion, regardless of
whether the customary practices were sufficient.
In applying a professional standard to blood banks in
transfusion-related AIDS cases, courts have precluded plaintiffs
from establishing the inadequacy of the national blood banking
community's standard of care." 5 In Osborn v. Irwin Memorial
Blood Bank,"6 the plaintiff alleged that the blood bank negli-
gently failed to implement surrogate testing and aggressive
..0 See Rasmussen v. South Florida Blood Servs., 500 So. 2d 533, 537-38
(Fla. 1987) (holding that donor identities should not be discovered).
131 Mike McKee, Blood Bank Cases: A Fair Fight?, RECORDER, May 1992,
at 4.
..
2 Quintana v. United Blood Servs., 827 P.2d 509, 524 (Colo. 1992); Osborn
v. Irwin Memorial Blood Bank, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 101, 124 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992);
Doe v. American Red Cross, 377 S.E.2d 323, 326 (S.C. 1989).
" Osborn, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 121 (citations omitted).
134 KEETON ET AL., supra note 125, § 32, at 189.
" See Osborn, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 120-21.
136 Id.
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donor screening."13 Rejecting the plaintiffs argument, the
court held that defendant's procedures conformed to the practic-
es followed by the industry and thus it was not liable.'38 In
addressing the surrogate testing issue, the court relied on the
evidence that no blood bank was performing surrogate tests in
early 1983 and concluded that an entire profession simply could
not be negligent.13 9 The court acknowledged that custom and
practice would not control in cases of ordinary negligence, citing
the landmark case The T.J. Hooper for this rule.' However,
it distinguished Osborn as a professional negligence case, thus
governed by the customary practice standard.'" This view
reflected the prevailing opinion in blood bank cases up to Quin-
tana.'4 In sum, what suppliers "should" have been doing at
the time of transfusion played a minimal role in transfusion-
related AIDS cases based on negligence.
2. Expert Qualifications
A second obstacle impeding plaintiffs from establishing
negligence has been the reluctance of certain courts to allow
expert testimony challenging the standard of care.' A few
courts have permitted only those with blood bank expertise to
137 Id. at 115. In February 1983, plaintiffs' child had contracted AIDS
through a blood transfusion supplied by Irwin Memorial. Id. at 103.
- Id. at 128.
'
39 Id. at 123-24.
140 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932). Judge Learned Hand wrote: "In most cases,
reasonable prudence is in fact common prudence; but strictly it is never its
measure; a whole calling may have unduly lagged in the adoption of new and
available devices. It may never set its own tests, however persuasive may be
its usages. Courts must in the end say what is required; there are precautions
so imperative that even their universal disregard will not excuse their
omission." Id. at 740.
141 Osborn, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 125. The court also discussed Helling v.
Carey, 519 P.2d 981 (1974), in which the Washington Supreme Court found an
opthamologist negligent for failing to administer a glaucoma test to a patient
under the age of 40, although expert testimony established that custom did
not require such testing. However, the Osborn court discounted Helling as the
minority rule. Osborn, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 126.
" See Doe v. American Red Cross, 377 S.E.2d 323, 325 (S.C. 1989); Hines
v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 527 P.2d 1075, 1078 (N.M. 1974).
1 See Quintana v. United Blood Serv., 827 P.2d 509, 517 (Colo. 1992);
Wilson v. Irwin Memorial Blood Bank, No. A054946, 1993 Cal. App. LEXIS
375, at *21 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 9, 1993).
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testify about the adequacy of the standard of care in the indus-
try at the time of transfusion. In doing so, courts have excluded
testimony by individuals highly prominent in the field of AIDS.
For example, Dr. Marcus Conant, a San Francisco physician and
professor who had been involved in AIDS clinical research since
its inception and treated thousands of AIDS patients since the
Spring of 1981,' has been excluded as an expert witness
because he was not directly practicing in the blood industry.
145
3. Limitations on Department of Health and Human
Services Employees
A third difficulty plaintiffs have encountered is the Federal
government's general prohibition of its scientists and Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services (HHS) employees from
testifying as experts or producing documents on blood transfu-
sion liability issues. 46 This ban includes researchers from the
Centers for Disease Control who warned blood bank officials in
January 1983 about the possible transmissibility of AIDS
through blood and the need for greater precautionary mea-
sures. 47 By 1989, the government had avoided at least fifty
144 BLOOD SUPPLY SAFETY, supra note 54, at 11-12 (testimony of Dr.
Marcus Conant, Professor, University of California Medical Center at San
Francisco). Dr. Conant started the first multi-disciplinary AIDS clinic in the
U.S. in the summer of 1981 and also started the organization that later
became the San Francisco AIDS Foundation in May of 1982. He established
the AIDS Clinical Research Center at the University of California Medical
Center, San Francisco. Further, Dr. Conant chaired the California Task
Force on AIDS until 1988 when he was appointed Co-Chair of the California
AIDS Leadership Committee.
145 Quintana, 827 P.2d at 513; Wilson, 1993 LEXIS 375, at *21.
146 See Moore v. Armour Pharmaceutical, 927 F.2d 1194 (11th Cir. 1991).
The HHS promulgated regulations restricting employee testimony in private
litigation. The regulations read in part:
No Department of Health and Human Services employee may
provide testimony or produce documents in any proceeding to which
this part applies concerning information acquired in the course of
performing official duties or because of the employee's official
relationship with the Department of Health and Human Services
unless authorized by the agency head, after consultation with the
Office of the General Counsel, that compliance with the request
would promote the objectives of the Department of Health and
Human Services.
45 C.F.R. § 2.3(a) (1992).
147 See supra text accompanying notes 45-47.
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requests or subpoenas from plaintiffs' attorneys seeking testimo-
ny of certain CDC physicians' 48
According to one department official, the government
blocked such testimony to "minimize interference with the
performance of official duties and preserve the impartiality of
the department."'4 9 The government has also argued that
allowing such testimony would violate its practice of remaining
"strictly neutral" in private litigation. 50  Yet, CDC officials
and other government employees who fall under the prohibition
have testified on behalf of defendant blood banks.'51 The ef-
fect of this policy has been to further disadvantage plaintiffs,
preventing valuable testimony on behalf of transfusion-AIDS
victims. 15
2
In Moore v. Armour Pharmaceutical,'53 plaintiffs sought to
subpoena CDC physician, Dr. Bruce Evatt. 5  The HHS had
prohibited plaintiffs from deposing Dr. Evatt, and the Eleventh
Circuit upheld the district court's quashing of the subpoena. In
ruling against the plaintiffs, the court found the government's
interest in "maximizing the use of its limited resources in
dealing with a national health crisis" outweighed the plaintiffs
interest in deposing Dr. Evatt
55
'
48 Parloff, supra note 74, at 79.
149 See Moore, 927 F.2d at 1196-97.
150 Id.
151 Parloff, supra note 74, at 79 (discussing a CDC official designated to
testify for the Red Cross in a case which ultimately ended in summary
judgment, and an official from the National Institutes of Health, a part of
Health and Human Services, who did testify).
5 2 See generally SHILTs, supra note 41, at 220-21.
13 927 F.2d 1194, 1195-96 (11th Cir. 1991). The plaintiffs sued blood
industry members who allegedly supplied contaminated blood to their chil-
dren. The children were hemophiliacs who became infected with HIV. Id.
'5 Id. at 1196. Plaintiffs sought testimony regarding the CDC's position
with respect to the evolution of AIDS and the screening techniques available
at specific times. See BLOOD SUPPLY SAFETY, supra note 54, at 78. Dr. Evatt,
one of the CDC's leading AIDS researchers, had presented data in 1982 and
again in 1983 showing AIDS carriers could be identified by surrogate tests.
Id.
155 Moore, 927 F.2d at 1197. The court also found the plaintiffs subpoena
too broad since the information sought could have led to months of testimony
by Dr. Evatt. Id. at 1198.
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4. Discovery of Donor Identity
A fourth obstacle for plaintiffs alleging negligence has been
the reluctance of courts to permit disclosure of a donor's identi-
ty.5 ' To protect the privacy and preserve the confidentiality
of blood donors, courts have denied access to donor identities.
This has precluded plaintiffs from a useful means of exposing
possible deficient donor screening procedures, since donors are
frequently in a good position to know whether blood banks
adhered to customary practices. For example, a donor would
best know whether a blood bank provided accurate information
on high-risk groups. Yet, courts have resisted divulging their
identities. Some courts, however, have adopted approaches that
preserve anonymity, while allowing plaintiffs to obtain neces-
sary information. In Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood Center. v.
District Court,57 the blood donor furnished the court clerk
with his name and address, enabling the clerk to provide him
with a written questionnaire.' Upon receipt of the answers,
the court instructed the clerk to delete all reference to donor
identity, protecting the confidentiality of the information.'59
This procedure effectively circumvented the statute forbidding
access to identities of individuals who tested positive for AIDS
while still preserving donors' privacy.
6 0
15 See Rasmussen v. South Florida Blood Serv., 500 So. 2d 533, 537-38
(Fla. 1987). Where access might deter future donation, the court found
society's interest in maintaining the blood supply greater than the plaintiffs
need for discovery.
157 See Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood Ctr. v. District Court, 763 P.2d 1003
(Colo. 1988).
1 8 Id. at 1007.
159 Id.
16o See Gregory N. Woods & Ann V. Thornton, Deadly Blood: Litigation of
Transfusion-Associated AIDS Cases in Texas, 21 TEX. TECH L. REV. 667, 713
(1990). Examples of questions that a plaintiff may seek to ask a donor include
the following: whether the blood bank screener provided information on
high-risk groups, whether the high-risk information was adequate to alert the
donor that he or she might fall into such a group, or whether the blood bank
gave the donor a confidential opportunity to defer giving blood. Id.
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HI. QUINTANA v. UNITED BLOOD SERVICES 61
While the outcome of each transfusion-AIDS victim's case
depends on its particular facts and circumstances, the Quintana
litigation demonstrates the arguments plaintiffs typically
advance and the difficulties they encounter in seeking compen-
sation for their injuries. The plaintiffs in Quintana were able to
overcome these obstacles with greater success than other AIDS
transfusion plaintiffs. The Colorado Supreme Court's holding
that blood banks acting in conformity with industry practices
could still be second-guessed in court, and the subsequent jury
verdict finding the entire blood industry negligent may open the
door to recovery for plaintiffs in similar transfusion cases.
A. ORIGINS OF QUINTANA
The Quintana case arose from the transfusion of several
units of blood and plasma received by plaintiff Susie Quintana
on May 27, 1983, during emergency surgery for an accidental
gunshot wound. 6 2 United Blood Services (UBS), a division of
the nation's second-largest blood-gathering organization, sup-
plied the contaminated blood to the Cortez, Colorado hospital
which treated Quintana." Two years later, in December
1985, doctors diagnosed Quintana with AIDS.", Upon notifi-
cation that one of the units of blood or plasma she received may
have been infected, UBS conducted tests which revealed that
one of the donors was in fact infected with HIV at the time of
the transfusion.'65
B. THE FIRST TRIAL
Susie Quintana and her husband filed suit against UBS,
alleging negligence for failure to adequately screen high-risk
donors through questioning and physical examination, and
failure to employ available tests that would have indicated the
161 811 P.2d 424 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991), affd, 827 P.2d 509 (Colo. 1992).
162 Quintana, 827 P.2d at 512.
"
65 Id. UBS is a non-profit blood banking division of Blood Systems, Inc.
Id.
164 Quintana, 811 P.2d at 426.
165 Id. UBS also learned from the donor's physician that the donor
"pursued 'a gay lifestyle."' Quintana, 827 P.2d at 512.
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presence of HIV in the donated blood.'66  In response, UBS
admitted that it furnished the units of blood transfused into
Quintana and that the donor of one of those units later tested
positive for the AIDS infection.'67 Nevertheless, UBS denied
that it acted negligently, maintaining that its donor screening
and blood testing procedures at the time of Quintana's transfu-
sion "conformed with industry custom and practice," thus
meeting the applicable standard of care and shielding the blood
bank from liability."
During the trial, the court ruled that the defendant's con-
duct should be measured against the professional negligence
standard - what others in the industry were doing at the
time.'69 The trial court limited the scope of admissible evi-
dence by excluding three of plaintiffs' experts who would have
challenged the reasonableness of 1983 industry practices.170
Moreover, the court instructed the jury that "a blood bank's
compliance with custom and practice established, as a matter of
law, the absence of negligence." '171 Subsequently, the jury
returned a general verdict in favor of the defendant, finding
that UBS was not liable because its screening practices had
complied with industry standards.'72
C. PLAINTIFFS CHALLENGE RULING
On appeal, the plaintiffs challenged the trial court's incor-
poration of a professional negligence standard of care, which
could only be established by experts familiar with the industry's
customary practices.' The Quintanas argued, "the reason-
ableness of the defendant's conduct, rather than compliance
with accepted and customary practices of blood banks, should
govern the determination of their negligence claims."'7 4 The
Colorado Court of Appeals agreed, holding that "ordinary princi-
166 Id.
167 Id.
16 8 Id. at 427.
169 Quintana, 827 P.2d at 513.
171 Id. at 517.
171 Quintana, 811 P.2d at 428.
172 Id.
173 Quintana, 827 P.2d at 518.
74 Quintana, 811 P.2d at 427.
TRANSFUSION-RELATED AIDS LIABILITY
ples of negligence" should control. 75 The appellate court con-
cluded that the trial court erred in excluding plaintiffs' evidence
which challenged the reasonableness of the blood industry's
customs and practices.'76 Furthermore, the court found error
in the trial judge's jury instructions equating compliance with
industry custom with the absence of negligence. 77 In light of
the foregoing, the appellate court reversed the jury verdict and
ordered a new trial.
17
D. COLORADO SUPREME COURT
The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari to review
the decision of the court of appeals.7 9  While the supreme
court found that the court of appeals should have imposed a
professional standard of care rather than a general standard,
the Colorado high court stated that compliance with that stan-
dard was "not conclusive proof that additional precautions were
not required."'8 0 Furthermore, the supreme court sanctioned
the admissibility of the Quintanas' proffered expert evi-
dence;'8 ' such evidence was necessary to establish that the
blood banking community's screening and testing procedures
were unreasonably deficient in protecting the blood supply from
the AIDS threat.'82 According to the Court, the trial court's
exclusion of this evidence was "tantamount to permitting the
blood banking community to establish its own standard of legal
liability despite evidence tending to show that the blood banking
175 Id. at 431. The court found that defendant's conduct should be mea-
sured against what a reasonable and prudent blood bank would or should have
done under the same or similar circumstances. Id.
176 Id.
I7 Quintana, 827 P.2d at 517-18. The court defined negligence as the
failure to meet the standard of the professional community to which UBS
belonged, and instructed the jury that as long as UBS' procedures were
consistent with the standard of care of the community, that it would not be
negligent.
178 Quintana, 811 P.2d at 432.
179 Quintana, 827 P.2d at 511.
18 Id. at 525.
1
" Id. at 517. Plaintiffs had formerly been excluded from introducing the
testimony of Dr. Marcus A. Conant, Dr. Thomas Asher and Dr. Edgar Engle-
man. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
'" Quintana, 827 P.2d at 525.
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community had adopted unreasonably deficient pfactices and proced-
ures."' Finally, the supreme court afrmed the appellate
court's finding of error in the jury instructions equating compli-
ance with the blood banking industry's customs and practices
with the absence of negligence.'8 ' The supreme court did not
express an opinion on whether the blood banking industry's
standard of care fell below a reasonable level, or whether UBS
itself was negligent; however, the court granted the Quintanas
a new trial, leaving this determination to be made by a jury.
E. THE SECOND TRIAL
Four months after the supreme court decision, a Denver
trial court jury ordered UBS to pay $6.6 million to Susie Quin-
tana and $1.65 million to her husband following a three-week
trial. s5 After five and one half hours of deliberation, the jury
concluded that in light of the standard of care in the blood
banking industry in April 1983, UBS had negligently supplied
AIDS-contaminated blood to Quintana.' Moreover, the jury
found that the standard of care set by the blood banking profes-
sion as a whole was "unreasonably deficient," because the
industry had failed to use "proven scientific safeguards" to
protect the blood supply.'
F. ANALYSIS
The Quintana case signifies a departure from the protection
traditionally afforded blood suppliers from transfusion-associ-
ated litigation and a willingness of courts to give greater weight
to the interests of transfusion victims. In Quintana, the plain-
tiffs were able to overcome the traditional obstacles facing
similarly situated plaintiffs. First, the Colorado appeals and
supreme court decisions conceded that the national blood bank-
183 Id.
184 Id.
"8 See Quintana v. United Blood Services, No. 86 Civ. 11750 (Dist. Ct.,
Denver County, Colo. Aug. 1, 1991) (Special Verdict Forms A, B, C), affd, 811
P.2d 424 (Colo. App. 1991), affd and remanded, 827 P.2d 509 (Colo. 1992).
The jury awarded Susie Quintana $6.5 million for negligence, and Chris $1.65
million for negligent infliction of emotional distress and loss of consortium.
... Pankratz, supra note 20, at A, 15K
1 8 7 Id.
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ing industry's standard of care may have been lagging at the
time of Quintana's transfusion, and so, conformity with such
standards did not establish due care. In allowing a jury to
scrutinize the blood banking industry's standards, rather than
rely solely on adherence to custom as evidence of due care, the
supreme court effectively required only a general standard of
care, while ostensibly ruling that a professional standard of care
applied in these negligence cases. Thus, under Quintana, if a
blood bank acted in accordance with other members of the blood
banking community, such compliance with custom no longer
provides an absolute defense to liability.
Second, the plaintiffs in Quintana benefitted from the
admission of expert testimony by individuals with national
reputations in the field of AIDS, but who lacked so-called "blood
bank expertise." Overcoming the trial court's pretrial ruling
excluding plaintiffs proffered expert testimony, the Quintanas
presented the testimony of Dr. Marcus Conant, Dr. Thomas
Asher and Dr. Edgar Engleman. 88 These experts sharply
criticized the response of the blood industry to the AIDS cri-
sis.189
Third, in Quintana, the expert testimony of Dr. Donald
Francis, a former CDC researcher, was allowed. 90 Dr. Fran-
cis had been previously prohibited by the government from
testifying; however, in 1992 he retired from the CDC and left its
control.'" His testimony was instrumental in establishing a
deficient standard of care in the national blood banking commu-
nity because in early 1983, Dr. Francis had forcefully warned
blood bank officials to adopt safety measures to protect the
blood supply.192 His criticism of the blood industry was partic-
' Quintana, 827 P.2d at 517.
1 89Howard Pankratz, AIDS Expert: Blood Bank Negligent in '83, DENVER
POST, July 16, 1992, at IA, 12A, see Pankratz, supra note 20, at 15A. This
testimony convinced juror that the blood banks were "dragging their feet."
' See Parloff, supra note 74, at'79.
191 Id.
"2 SHILTS, supra note 41, at 221. During the previously mentioned
January 4, 1983 CDC meeting, Shilts described Dr. Francis as pounding his
fist on the table and shouting, "How many people have to die? How many
deaths do you need? Give us the threshold of death that you need in order to
believe that this is happening and well meet at that time and we can start
doing something."
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ularly helpful since it was based on what he and other CDC re-
searchers knew in 1983, rather than on hindsight.
93
Finally, the court in Quintana allowed plaintiffs to corre-
spond in writing with the donor of the tainted blood, while
preserving his anonymity.'9 The donor was served with a
written interrogatory under oath, posing a number of questions
designed to ascertain whether the donor was at high risk for
AIDS. 9 ' The interrogatory concluded by asking the donor if
the preceding questions had been read to him, whether any of
his replies would have been yes.'98 The donor answered affir-
matively, thereby indicating that he fell into a high-risk
group.'97 In response to Quintana's litigation, he wrote, "My
understanding of AIDS, at the time I donated blood, was that it
was most likely to occur, and had occurred, among Haitians,
intravenous drug users and homosexual men with a history of
promiscuity - over 1,000 different sexual partners.
198
IV. PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES
In assessing tort liability, a court should consider the
potential impact of a decision on the general public. Due in part
to the conflicting interests of individuals, determining where the
public interest lies is a complex task; however, a just and
practical result for the present and future requires courts to
undertake this process."' An examination of the public policy
193 See Mike McKee, A Long Awaited Witness From the CDC, RECORDER,
Sept. 21, 1992, at 1. The availability of Dr. Francis as an expert witness
should also benefit future plaintiffs. Since Dr. Francis retired he has been
deposed for at least six other trials. Id.
194 Quintana, 827 P.2d at 517.
195 The written interrogatory provided donor with the following questions:
1) Have you ever had sexual contact with someone who had received a blood
transfusion?; 2) Have you ever had sexual contact with someone who is in a
group at high risk of AIDS or exposure to AIDS?; 3) Have you ever visited
Haiti?; 4) Have you ever injected drugs into your vein(s)?; 5) Have you ever
had sex with a man since 1978?; 6) Are you a hemophiliac?. Id.
196 The interrogatory did not require that he indicate to which questions,
if any, he would answer yes.
197 Id.; see generally Howard Pankratz, Gay Thought Only Promiscuous Got
AIDS, DENVER POST, July 22, 1992.
198 Id. Such correspondence helped the Quintanas establish the blood
bank's negligence and should likewise benefit future plaintiffs.
199 KEETON ET AL., supra note 125, § 3, at 15-16.
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issues surrounding transfusion-related AIDS litigation illus-
trates the difficulty of weighing the competing societal interests
and the necessity of this inquiry both in achieving a fair result
for the parties involved and ensuring a safer blood supply.
If other courts follow the second trial court in Quintana in
holding the entire blood industry negligent for its actions after
mid-1983, the impact on blood suppliers will be considerable, as
a proliferation of lawsuits and potentially large judgment
awards are likely."' With the increased litigation, the ramifi-
cations on blood banks in terms of costs should be significant.
The increased potential for liability will probably lead to sub-
stantially higher insurance premiums for blood banks.0 1
Moreover, industry officials speculate that some blood banks
may have to file for bankruptcy protection.20 2 Ultimately, im-
posing such liability on blood suppliers will affect all of society
as hospitals, insurers and consumers will have to share the in-
creased costs in the form of higher prices for blood. In addition
to the economic costs, these lawsuits may negatively impact the
morale of people in the blood industry,0 3 and cause a loss of
the public trust necessary to recruit donors.2 '
On the other hand, the multi-million dollar verdict in
Quintana may raise the hopes and expectations of similarly
situated victims of contaminated transfusions. From the per-
spective of these individuals, and society at large, imposing
liability will have positive effects. Not only will victims be
compensated for losses suffered, but under the threat of liabil-
ity, blood banks will have stronger incentives to prevent future
contamination, thereby enhancing the overall safety of the blood
supply.
200 See Stevens, supra note 14, at 232 (discussing recent liability awards).
See generally Carol McGraw, Some AIDS Victims Win Blood Cases, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 16, 1990, at 1.
2"1 Joshua Hammer, AIDS, Blood and Money, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 23, 1989,
at 43. In 1988, the Greater Ins. Co. of Cincinnati raised blood bank premiums
by 500%. Id.
212 See Sandra Blakeslee, Blood Banks Facing Hundreds of AIDS Suits,
NEW YORK TIMES, April 27, 1989, at 18; McGraw, supra note 200, at 1.
o Blakeslee, supra note 202, at 18. Mr. Gilbert Clark, executive director
of the American Association of Blood Banks explained, "[a] major problem
caused by these lawsuits is an emotional one .... This is a lifesaving
profession and people in it have a public service attitude toward life. All of a
sudden they're being accused of being baby killers." Id.
2 4 Parloff, supra note 74, at 78.
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Whether holding the blood industry liable for negligence
achieves a desirable social result thus poses a serious and
controversial question to the legal system. The following section
addresses this question and the surrounding issues, and con-
cludes that imposing liability on blood banks will best serve the
interests of society.
A. THE NATIONAL BLOOD POLICY
Prior to the early 1970's, one-quarter of the U.S. blood
supply came from paid donors." 5 At that time the incidence
of patients contracting hepatitis via transfusion was not uncom-
mon.2" 6 An influential study conducted in the late 1960's con-
cluded that cash blood caused higher rates of post-transfusion
hepatitis. °7 This view gained support in the U.S. among gov-
ernment officials, physicians and nonprofit blood collectors.0 8
Subsequently, in 1973, the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare (HEW) announced the National Blood Policy, aimed
at improving the quality of blood by encouraging its donation
and discouraging its sale. °9 The National Blood Policy called
for a safe and adequate blood supply for everyone in need 10
A decade later, the onset of the AIDS epidemic tested the
efficacy of this policy. During the early years of the disease, the
205 Eckert, supra note 6, at 6.
206 Id. Hepatitis is an inflammation of the liver capable of producing
malaise, anorexia, fever, nausea, and jaundice. Ultimately, it can lead to
chronic liver dysfunction and death. One aspect of the disease that distin-
guishes it from AIDS is that it can be successfully treated.
207 Id. at 7. That study and others indicated that hepatitis carriers were
more likely to be found among lower socioeconomic groups in inner cities with
poor health and sanitation facilities. Commercial blood banks were generally
located in these skid row areas, which were close to hospitals and sources of
supply. Thus, poor and destitute people, many of whom may not have known
they were infected with hepatitis or may have been willing to give false health
histories, often sold their blood to commercial blood banks for a cash payment.
Id. at 11.
2 0 8 Id. at 7, 14.
2 9 Id. It was thought that abandoning the practice of paying blood donors
and requiring an altruistic motive would reduce the incentive to donate for
those in skid row areas who were infected or at risk, and thereby raise the
quality of the blood supply. As a result of this federal policy, commercial blood
banks largely disappeared by the late 1970's. Id.
210 Nancy R. Holland, Blood Policy Dynamics: An Overview, in AIDS:
PUBLIC POLICY DIMENsIONs 101, 101 (John Griggs ed., 1987).
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blood industry fulfilled half of its responsibility - to maintain
an adequate blood supply - but failed at the other - to ensure
the safety of that supply.
B. BLOOD INDUSTRY'S FAILURE TO ENSURE THE SAFETY
OF THE BLOOD SUPPLY
Courts maintain that in 1983 the limited medical know-
ledge concerning AIDS did not warrant greater precautionary
measures than the ones taken.2 ' They claim that despite
warnings, the evidence that AIDS was transmissible by blood
was too inconclusive to justify any action that could threaten
the adequacy of the blood supply. 2 Furthermore, courts per-
mit blood suppliers to rely on custom, contending that since the
industry had not initiated new screening and testing proce-
dures, they were in compliance with the applicable standard of
care.213 By the middle of 1983, however, blood banking offi-
cials should have known that the linkage of AIDS to the blood
supply had alarmed the public and had reduced the number of
donors.214 The blood banks probably perceived that this could
threaten the quantity of the blood supply as well as their own
financial viability.21 Moreover, blood banking leaders ap-
peared to understand that an early response to the crisis could
subject them to unwanted liability.2 6 As a result, the indus-
"' See Osborn v. Irwin Memorial Blood Bank, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 101, 128-29
(Cal. Ct. App. 1992); Wilson v. Irwin Memorial Blood Bank, No. A054946, 1993
Cal. App. LEXIS 375, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 9, 1993); Kozup v. Georgetown
Univ., 663 F. Supp. 1048, 1053 (D.D.C. 1987); Valdiviez v. U.S., 884 F.2d 196,
197 (5th Cir. 1989).
212 See cases cited supra note 211, 214.
21 Id.; see also Kirkendall v. Harbor Ins. Co., 698 F. Supp. 768, 778-79
(W.D. Ark. 1988).
214 See James Mann, AIDS Scare Hits Nation's Blood Supply, U.S. NEWS
& WORLD REPORT, July 25, 1983, at 71. BLOOD SUPPLY SAFETY, supra note
54, at 12-13, 116 (statement of Dr. Marcus Conant, Exhibit G).
25 BLOOD SUPPLY SAFETY, supra note 54, at 12-13, 116 (statement of Dr.
Marcus Conant, Exhibit G).
216 Id. at 73 (Exhibit C). An internal report written by Dr. Joseph Bove
stated, "[bilood banks that wish to sell plasma . .. need to do something.
Perhaps our Committee should prepare guidelines .... We are reluctant to
do this since we do not want anything we do now to be interpreted by society
(or legal authorities) as agreeing with the concept.., that AIDS can be spread
by blood." Id.
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try responded with extreme caution.2" Their approach was
first to reject the possibility that AIDS was transmissible by
blood, then to downplay the risks of transfusion-associated
AIDS and reassure the public and the medical profession that
the blood supply was safe.2
For example, on January 13, 1983, the three voluntary
blood service organizations 219 issued a joint statement indicat-
ing that the risk of contracting AIDS through transfusion was
"one-in-a million. '" 22 ' Again on June 22, 1983 the three orga-
nizations issued a joint news release repeating the one case per
million statistic.22 ' A later test, however, revealed that in
nine regional Red Cross centers, 38 per 100,000 donors were HIV-in-
fected, or 380 persons per million.22  As one commentator
points out, blood bank officials probably should not have made
the "one-in-a-million" statement before they could have known
the real risk of transfusion-associated AIDS.2 2 No one expect-
ed the blood banks to anticipate, protect and warn against all
possible blood-related risks during the early years of the AIDS
epidemic; yet neither did anyone suspect that they would
engage in falsely reassuring the public and minimizing the risks
of transfusion-associated AIDS before fully understanding the
problem.22
21 See generally BLOOD SUPPLY SAFETY, supra note 54, at 12-13 (statement
of Dr. Marcus Conant, Professor, University of California Medical Center at
San Francisco).
218 Id.
21 The three organizations were the American Red Cross, the American
Association of Blood Banks, and the Council of Community Blood Centers.
220 BLOOD SUPPLY SAFETY, supra note 54, at 28 (statement of Ross D.
Eckert, Professor, Claremont McKenna College).
22 Id. at 116 (Exhibit G); see Ross D. Eckert, AIDS and the Blood Bankers,
REGULATION, Sept./Oct. 1986, at 15. Also, in June 1983, the president of the
American Association of Blood Banks said, "there is little or no danger to the
general public." Furthermore, former HHS secretary Margaret Heckler
announced that "there should be no fear among the public that they may
develop AIDS through.., blood transfusions." Id.
Schorr et al., Prevalence of HTLV-III Antibody in Blood Donors, 313
NEW ENG. J. MED. 384 (1985).
m BLOOD SUPPLY SAFETY, supra note 54, at 29 (statement of Ross Eckert,
Professor, Claremont McKenna College). The statement may have caused
some patients to undergo elective surgeries that they might have postponed if
they suspected the risks were greater, or unknown. Id.
See Harvey M. Sapolsky, Is Honesty the Best Policy?, in AIDS: PUBLIC
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In addition to downplaying the risk that HIV could be
transniitted by transfusion, the blood-industry erred in failing to
adopt readily available safety measures22 which would have
reduced the amount of AIDS-contaminated blood that entered
the blood supply prior to 1985.226 For example, at the Janu-
ary 4, 1983 meeting held by the CDC, participants had dis-
cussed donor questioning and listened to CDC researchers
present evidence that surrogate tests could screen out approxi-
mately ninety percent of individuals who had developed
AIDS.227 Yet, blood banks failed to adopt surrogate testing or
implement subsequent recommendations for greater precau-
tions.2  While it had not been scientifically established that
AIDS was transmissible through blood in the middle of 1983, it
had become a major blood banking issue and a well-recognized
possibility among the general public by the middle of 1983.229
Given the growing fear of AIDS, the increasingly apparent
seriousness of the disease, the probability of transmission by
blood and the availability of mechanisms to reduce the risks of
POLIcY DIMENsIONs, supra note 210, at 111 (arguing that shading the truth,
or "minmization," is a form of dishonesty that may not be a wise choice for
blood banks where the safety of the blood supply and the public health are at
stake).
Namely, surrogate testing and aggressive donor screening as to life-
styles and behaviors, as well as medical histories, would have enhanced the
safety of the blood supply. Other measures include conducting physical
examinations to detect swollen lymph glands - an early symptom of AIDS -
or providing a confidential room for donor questioning.
" See BLOOD SUPPLY SAFETY, supra note 54, at 33-37 (testimony of Dr.
Edgar Engleman).
227 Id. at 12-13, 107-09 (statement of Marcus A. Conant, Professor, Univer-
sity of California Medical Center at San Francisco, Exhibit A, Summary
Report from January 4, 1983 meeting). The summary report stated that
"laboratory tests... may be most effective in preventing potential transmit-
ters of AIDS." Id.
Id. at 13, 34-37 (statement of Dr. Marcus A. Conant, Professor, Univer-
sity of California Medical Center at San Francisco, and statement of Dr. Edgar
Engleman, Medical Director, Stanford University Blood Center); see supra note
60 and accompanying text. At least one blood bank acted on the information
by adopting surrogate testing and later attempted, to no avail, to demonstrate
its effectiveness.
' James Mann, AIDS Scare Hits Nation's Blood Supply, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REPORT, July 25, 1983, at 71; see also The Toll: Who the Victims Are,
NEWSWEEK, April 18, 1983, at 75. This article observed, "AIDS poses a serious
threat to the nation's 20,000 hemophiliacs, some of who require 30 to 40
transfusion of blood-clotting concentrates each year." Id.
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contamination, the prudent course of action would have been to
diligently protect the blood supply."' Instead, the blood
banks responded passively, first denying the existence of a
problem, then later downplaying the risks. 1  The report of
the Presidential Commission on the HIV Epidemic 2 reflects
this view, concluding that "the initial response of the nation's
blood banking industry to the possibility of contamination of the
nation's blood by a new infectious agent was unnecessarily
slow."2 3
In sum, evidence shows that the blood industry maintained
an adequate blood supply during the early years of the AIDS
epidemic, but failed to respond to threats to the safety of that
supply as quickly or as diligently as reasonably possible. The
blood industry could have screened donors more aggressively,
adopted surrogate testing, educated the public about AIDS, and
recommended alternative methods of obtaining blood for elective
surgeries. In fact blood banks were encouraged, or perhaps
warned, to take such measures;2 however, they declined to
"accept imperfect solutions to urgent problems." 5  Mean-
while, thousands of people were infected with HIV through
contaminated blood and blood products.
C. WHY DID THE BLOOD INDUSTRY FAIL?
Numerous commentators and critics offer explanations of
why the blood banking industry acted as it did between 1983
and 1985Y One explanation for the blood industry's inappro-
priate response to the AIDS crisis is the overriding concern with
" Notably, the factors listed which should have led to greater precaution-
ary measures are not observations made in hindsight but rather were appar-
ent in 1983 and 1984.
'3 See generally BLOOD SUPPLY SAFETY, supra note 54.
232 The advisory commission was created by executive order of Ronald
Reagan in 1987 to investigate the spread of HIV and to advise the President
on the public health dangers, including the medical, legal, ethical, social, and
economic impact, of the epidemic.
233 PRESIDENTIAL CoMMIssIoN REPORT, supra note 75, at 78.
m34 See BLOOD SUPPLY SAFETY, supra note 54, at 12-13, 33-37 (statement of
Dr. Marcus Conant and statement of Dr. Edgar Engleman).
2Id. at 34-35.
" See discussion infra parts IV.C.1-3.
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maintaining the adequacy of the blood supplyY Alternative
explanations, further discussed below, focus on the weak incen-
tives for blood banks to act diligently" and the preoccupation
with costs and profits displayed by blood suppliers."9
1. Maintaining an Adequate Blood Supply
One explanation for the blood banks' failure to respond
more quickly and aggressively to the threat of possible HIV-
contamination of the blood supply in mid-1983 involves their
concern with maintaining the adequacy of the blood supply."
During the earlier years of the AIDS epidemic, fears of blood
shortages and loss of donors seem to have influenced blood
banking officials to wait for more conclusive evidence that HIV
was indeed transmissible by blood rather than to take greater
precautions.
While a concern with maintaining the blood supply was
both important and legitimate, it serves as a tenuous justifica-
tion for failure to acknowledge and address the possible transfu-
sion transmission of AIDS in 1983 and 1984. In addition to
preserving an adequate blood supply, blood banks were also
responsible for ensuring its safety and educating the public as
to its risks. Moreover, alternative measures existed which could
have alleviated some of the alleged threat of shortage. For
example, blood banks could have recommended autologous
donations for patients prior to elective surgical procedures
whereby the patients own blood could be donated during the
month prior to surgery."' Blood banks could also have pro-
" See, e.g., Snyder v. Mekhjian, 582 A.2d 307, 318 (N.J. 1990); BLOOD
SUPPLY SAFETY, supra note 54, at 13, 91 (statement of Dr. Marcus Conant).
8 BLOOD SUPPLY SAFETY, supra note 54, at 18-23 (statement of Ross D.
Eckert, Professor, Claremont McKenna College); Eckert, supra note 6, at
40-52; Eckert, supra note 221, at 16-18.
" See generally Rock, supra note 42; Hammer, supra note 201; Parloff,
supra note 74, at 81.
240 See, e.g., Snyder, 593 A.2d at 318; BLOOD SUPPLY SAFETY, supra note
54, at 13, 91 (statement of Dr. Marcus Conant, Professor, University of
California Medical Center at San Francisco).
"' BLOOD SUPPLY SAFETY, supra note 54, at 36 (statement of Dr. Edgar
Engleman). Autologous blood is unquestionably the safest blood because it
does not expose patients to any infections to which they are not already
exposed. While most blood banks did not refuse to take autologous blood, they
may have discouraged its use by limiting the locations and hours available for
1993]
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vided directed donations, which patients were requesting, 2 or
returned to the practice of compensating aggressively screened
donors. Another possibility was the implementation of donor
registries.243 Finally, the blood industry could have developed
innovative methods for maintaining an adequate blood supply,
such as requiring patients who received medical services to
donate blood as part of their payment.21' While such alterna-
tives would probably have increased the costs for blood banks,
they could have shifted the costs to hospitals, insurers and
consumers. Thus, notwithstanding concerns about the quantity
of the blood supply, the more appropriate course of action would
have been to depart from familiar routines and attempt to
reduce the risk of HIV-tainted transfusion during the early
years of the AIDS epidemic.
2. Weak Incentives to Change Industry Custom
Another explanation for the blood industry's excessively
cautious approach centers on the lack of incentives for blood
banks to act diligently to ensure the safety of the blood supply
in 1983. The structure of the blood industry, its influence over
regulation, and its general immunity from liability minimized
the incentives for blood banks to respond quickly and aggres-
sively to the AIDS threat.
First, the reorganization of the blood services industry in
the 1970's, pursuant to the national blood policy, contributed to
the creation of weak incentives to actively safeguard the blood
supply in the early 1980's. Among the goals of the 1973 nation-
al blood policy was to discourage the sale of blood, and reduce
competition for donors among nonprofit blood banks through
regionalization. 5 Subsequently, commercial blood suppliers
virtually disappeared and local nonprofit monopolies or cartels
donations. Id.
2 A directed donation is the collection and use of a designated donor's
blood for a specific patient. Thus, patients undergoing surgery could request
that their family donate any necessary blood.
2 See Eckert, supra note 221, at 20. Successful donor registries would
require more frequent donations from a smaller pool of low-risk, demonstrably
healthy donors, probably for cash payment. Id.
2 Alinka F. Baker, Comment, Liability Without Fault and the AIDS
Plague Compel a New Approach to Cases of Transfusion-Transmitted Disease,
61 U. COLO. L. REv. 81, 85 (1990).
2"5 Eckert, supra note 6, at 6.
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replaced them. 6 Regional associations of local blood banks
and hospitals formed, and hospitals and patients had little
choice but to purchase the blood supplied by their regional blood
bank. 7 Thus, consumer demand for safe blood had little
effect. As a result of this lack of competition, the blood indus-
try's incentives to take necessary precautions in the face of the
AIDS crisis were weak.
Second, the influence of the blood industry over its own
regulation also functioned to limit its incentives to act diligently
in 1983.2 While the FDA set the minimum standards for
screening donors and testing blood, the FDA had relied heavily
on blood bank officials for guidance, thereby creating the oppor-
tunity for self-interested advice. 9 One critic reflected this
view, describing published FDA recommendations as "nothing
more than watered-down recommendations from the blood
banking industry itself."250 Moreover, the FDA Blood Products
Advisory Committee had received far more information from
blood banks than consumers, and thus favored the blood
banks. 51 In addition to lopsided information, suppliers have
had an advantage over consumers because three of the eleven
voting committee members are blood bankers, compared to one
nonvoting consumer representative.2 2  The committee's rec-
ommendations to the FDA probably reflected this unequal
representation. Consequently, the resulting regulations provid-
' Eckert, supra note 221, at 16-17. In 1978, the FDA required separate
labeling of cash and noncash blood, subjecting medical services providers to
increased liability for using cash blood. Id.
7 Id. at 17.
"
8 BLOOD SUPPLY SAFETY, supra note 54, at 22 (statement of Ross Eckert,
Professor, Claremont McKenna College).
2A9 Id.
250 Id. at 14 (statement of Dr. Marcus Conant, Professor, University of
California Medical Center at San Francisco).
251 Id. at 29-31 (statement of Ross Eckert, Professor, University of Califor-
nia Medical Center at San Francisco). The Blood Products Advisory Commit-
tee is responsible for making recommendations to the FDA regarding trans-
fusion-related issues. Representatives of consumers who frequently use blood
products do not appear before the committee often and representatives of
healthy consumers appear rarely. This is due in part to the fact that healthy
consumers are unlikely to require a transfusion, and possess little information
about blood safety and regulation. Id.
212 Id. at 29.
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ed weak incentives for blood banks to actively safeguard the
blood supply during the early years of the AIDS epidemic."
The final factor that minimized the blood industry's incen-
tives to diligently reduce the risks of HIV contamination of the
blood supply was the customary protection afforded blood banks
from transfusion-associated liability." Blood shield statutes
immunized suppliers from sales-based liability in forty-eight
states,255 and industry custom provided an absolute defense to
negligence.25 6 Thus, blood banks knew that following the cus-
toms and practices of the industry would insulate them from
liability, and leave consumers with little opportunity to subject
them to discipline. This knowledge, combined with the noncom-
petitive nature of blood banks and the excessive influence
exerted by them on blood banking regulations produced weak
incentives for the industry to respond quickly and diligently to
the threat of AIDS.
3. Preoccupation with Costs
A final explanation for the foot-dragging of the blood indus-
try in response to the AIDS threat involves the profit-based
motives influencing blood banks. 7 Blood banking was a $2.5
billion business in 1989,258 and the risk of HIV-contaminated
transfusions threatened revenues.259 Where safety measures
to minimize the risk of HIV infection would have increased costs
without immediately recognizable benefits,260 non-profit blood
2
' Id. at 30.
24Id.
255 See supra notes 93-99 and accompanying text.
" See supra notes 131-142 and accompanying text.
17 See Rock, supra note 42, at 152; Hammer, supra note 201, at 43; Parloff,
supra note 74, at 81.
Hammer, supra note 201, at 43.
259Id. Despite reassurances, the risk of transfusion transmitted AIDS had
reduced the number of people willing to donate for fear that they could
somehow contract the disease by donating. Also, blood banking officials
suspected any type of testing or screening would result in a loss of donors and
blood - a situation they sought to avoid where their revenues relied on an
ever-increasing supply of blood.
m See Eckert, supra note 221, at 18; BLOOD SUPPLY SAFETY, supra note
54, at 118-19 (Exhibit I, Red Cross cost benefit analysis of surrogate testing).
See generally Rock, supra note 42.
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banks declined to implement such measures.61 Provided oth-
er industry members adhered to this low standard, suppliers
could claim custom as a defense and avoid liability, thus causing
great pressure for conformity. 2 In short, where the costs of
reducing the risk of transfusion transmitted AIDS were high
and the chances of incurring liability for inaction in 1983 were
low, blood suppliers focused primarily on the financial impact of
their decision rather than their responsibility to safeguard the
blood supply.
D. THE BLOOD BANKING INDUSTRY SHOULD BE HELD
ACCOUNTABLE IN LIGHT OF SOCIETAL INTERESTS
Thousands of people in the U.S. are infected with HIV as a
result of contaminated transfusions received between 1983 and
1985. For the individuals who have developed AIDS, the
economic and social costs are overwhelming.2 " In the past,
the policy of protecting an adequate blood supply which shielded
blood suppliers from liability seems to have outweighed the
rights of individual victims of transfusion-associated AIDS to
recover damages. But this calculation overlooks the compara-
tively important policies of ensuring the safety of the blood
supply.
Three factors in evaluating the conflicting interests of
suppliers against that of victims and society are the moral
aspect of the defendant's conduct, the capacity of the parties to
bear the loss, and the prevention of future harmY.2 5 The fol-
lowing discussion will apply the three factors to transfusion
AIDS litigation and conclude that holding the7 blood industry
negligent achieves a socially desirable result by punishing the
2 1 Taking such precautions would also raise the standard of care, subject-
ing blood banks to greater liability - another situation blood banking officials
sought to avoid.
262 See, e.g., BLOOD SUPPLY SAFETY, supra note 54, at 93-95 (Exhibit E,
affidavit of Dr. David De Jongh).
2 See , supra note 9.
264 See Monthly Review, AIDS L. & Litig. Rep. (Univ. Pub. Group), Jan.
1992, at 5. The estimated cost of annual treatment is $32,000 per patient and
range much higher. This estimate assumes averages of 1.6 hospital stays per
year at 15 days per stay, and $1,000 a day for time in the hospital. It also
assumes that outpatient costs comprise 25% of the total calculated cost of care
for an AIDS patient. Id.
265 KEETON ET AL., supra note 125, § 4, at 21-25.
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blood industry for past culpable conduct, allocating the loss to
the party most capable of absorbing it, and giving blood suppli-
ers future incentive to more diligently maintain the safety of the
blood supply.
1. Moral Aspect of Defendant's Conduct
In balancing the conflicting interests of blood suppliers and
victims of contaminated transfusions, one factor which weighs
in favor of victims is the moral aspect of the defendants con-
duct. 6 As Prosser explained, moral blame or fault has come
to mean "no more than a departure from the conduct required of
man by society for the protection of others, and it is the public
and social interest which determines what is required." '67 In
reference to transfusion cases, evidence suggests that blood
suppliers imposed an unreasonable risk of harm on transfusion
recipients from 1983 to 1985. They responded unnecessarily
slowly to initial threats of contamination of the blood sup-
ply,26 declined to implement surrogate testing and aggressive
donor screening,269 and downplayed the risk of infection with
HIV through blood °.2 " For this failure to live up to an "ideal
standard of conduct"27' as viewed by society, the blood indus-
try should be held negligent as a matter of public policy.
Blood suppliers' fears of shrinking revenues and loss of
donors272 hardly seem to justify inaction, especially when al-
ternative methods of collecting blood were available and the
costs could have been shifted to consumers and insurers. The
growing awareness of the seriousness of AIDS and the devastat-
ing impact of the potential injury on its victims should have
prompted blood suppliers to act. Most patients, if faced with
the choice between a risk of contracting AIDS through transfu-
sion or an opportunity to protect themselves at a greater ex-
pense, would undoubtedly have accepted the added costs.7
26 Id.
2867 Id. at 18.
21 See supra notes 211, 214-217 and accompanying text.
" See supra notes 225-229 and accompanying text.
270 See supra notes 218-224 and accompanying text.
271 KEETON ET AL., supra note 125, § 4, at 22.
22 Hammer, supra note 201, at 43.
273 BLOOD SUPPLY SAFETY, supra note 54, at 77 (testimony of Dr. Conant,
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However, as previously discussed, transfusion recipients exer-
cised little control over the blood they acquired. 74 At the
least, blood banks could have given transfusion recipients the
option of incurring costs to reduce the risk of injury.
In sum, the blood industry had a duty to the public to
safeguard the blood supply. Yet, it appears that during the
early years of the AIDS epidemic, blood suppliers focused
excessively on their costs, rather than attending to the safety of
the blood and the impact of AIDS on its victims. For failing to
reduce the risk of HIV infection through blood by readily avail-
able measures, the interests of society favor that blood banks be
held negligent.
2. Capacity to Bear the Loss
Imposing liability on blood service organizations also fur-
thers societal interests by allocating the loss to the party more
able to absorb and avoid it. One objective of tort law is to
compensate victims for unreasonable harm, and courts have
often attempted to place the financial burden on the party who
is best suited to bear it. 275 In the context of transfusion-re-
lated AIDS litigation the party best able to shoulder the burden
appears to be the blood supplier.
Blood suppliers have the capacity to bear loss due to their
substantial annual revenues and liability insurance policies.2 76
In procuring these policies, blood banks can anticipate the
potential of tort suits arising from the transfusion of contami-
nated blood. Furthermore, blood suppliers may spread the loss
among hospitals, consumers and their insurers in the form of
higher prices for blood. In doing so, they can effectively maxi-
mize the number of people bearing the loss and minimize its
effect on each person.
Individual AIDS victims on the other hand often do not
have the capacity to cover the costs associated with the dis-
ease.277 The expenses for treatment and care are enormous,
Professor, University of California Medical Center at San Francisco).
See supra notes 248-254 and accompanying text.
2 KEETON ET AL., supra note 125, § 4, at 22. This is a function of the
capacity of both parties to absorb the loss or avoid it.
276 See Hammer, supra note 201, at 44.
7 See generally Gordon Bock, A Burden Too Heavy to Bear: Insurance
Companies Face the Staggering Cost of AIDS, TIME, Aug. 31, 1987, at 39.
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and regardless of who shoulders the economic burden, the
victims must bear the social costs of the disease. 7 8 Moreover,
one in five AIDS patients has no insurance, and those with
private insurance often do not receive coverage for the services
most needed. 1 9 In light of the foregoing considerations, the
blood industry appears best able to bear the cost, thus bolster-
ing the public policy argument in favor of holding the industry
liable for its action between mid-1983 and 1985.
3. Prevention of Future Harm
A final policy factor favoring imposing liability on the blood
service industry is the prevention of future harm."' As dis-
cussed earlier, the blood industry had limited incentives to
actively safeguard the blood supply during the early years of the
AIDS epidemic."' Blood banks were virtually immune from
liability as long as they complied with custom. Yet, where the
blood banks themselves heavily influenced industry standards,
compliance with custom may have provided insufficient protec-
tion. A more socially desirable policy would allow courts to
scrutinize custom, as the supreme court permitted in Quintana,
and subject the blood industry to liability where the evidence
establishes that their actions and omissions were inappropriate.
This policy would provide suppliers with increased financial
incentive to adopt available precautionary measures to prevent
future harm. Such prevention would be preferable to a policy of
reaction where it might result in a decrease in transfusion-re-
lated litigation and, ultimately, the saving of lives.
CONCLUSION
Blood banks may no longer be immune from liability in
transfusion-related AIDS litigation. The Colorado Supreme
27 See generally Mary C. Dunlap, AIDS and Discrimination in the United
States: Reflections on the Nature of Prejudice, 34 ViLL. L. REV. 909 (1989); see
also Fineberg, supra note 1, at 128. People known to be infected with HIV
have lost jobs, homes and friends while children with AIDS have been denied
access to public schools. Id.
279 Fineberg, supra note 1, at 134. For example, private health insurance
covers only 15 percent of the cost of drugs prescribed outside the hospital. Id.
o See generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 125, § 4, at 23.
8,See supra notes 248-257 and accompanying text.
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Court's decision in Quintana v. United Blood Services demon-
strates one court's willingness to depart from the traditional
protection afforded the nation's blood banks and to give greater
weight to the interests of transfusion victims. In allowing a
jury to scrutinize blood-industry standards at the time of trans-
fusion, the court opened the door to imposing liability on the
supplier of contaminated blood and led to a finding that the
entire blood industry was negligent. Subsequently, Quintana
could have significant implications for blood suppliers, tainted-
transfusion recipients and their respective insurers.
Imposing liability on blood banks for contaminated blood
distributed in mid-1983 and thereafter achieves a socially
desirable result where the evidence established that blood banks
knew by early 1983 of the risk of transfusion-transmitted AIDS,
yet declined to respond to the threat until 1985. By holding
blood banks negligent for failing to adequately avoid the risk of
tainted transfusions, the legal system punishes the blood indus-
try for past culpable conduct, allocates the loss to the party best
able to bear it and promotes prevention in American health
care. Where the immunity once afforded blood suppliers from
liability may have inhibited incentives to act, imposing liability
in cases like Quintana should compel the blood industry to more
diligently -maintain the safety of the blood supply should a
similar situation arise.
Jessamine R. Talaverat
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